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When I delivered my Donald Home Address Madness, Markets and the Middle Way in February 1992,1 was called a squib for not 
ver, as I had been away from Australia fornearly ten 
years, I thought it would have been a bit of a cheek 
to arrive home giving detailed advice as I stepped 
off the plane, as opposed to raising key issues and 
identifying real problems in a more general way. I 
did make some specific suggestions in my Home 
Address, whenever I felt I was competent to do so.1
What then of macroeconomic policy for a small 
open economy on the Pacific Rim which has an 
enduring and indeed honendous balance of pay­
ments problem, an extremely serious unemploy­
ment problem and major pockets of unacceptable 
levels of poverty in what basically is still an affluent 
setting out systematically the detailed ingredients 
of my ‘Middle Way’ between planning and the 
unfettered market. I must try to do better this time. 
One reason why 1 ‘squibbed’ was that I believed (I 
still do) that a necessary prerequisite was to analyse 
the implications when important markets—those 
for labour, property, foreign exchange, financial 
assets—do not behave in a socially optimum man­
ner as the economic textbooks would have it. Only 
then would it be possible to think about policies 
which were designed to deal with the many by­
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products of their individual and collective impacts 
on the working of the Australian economy. 
Moreoand relatively harmonious society?
Over the last 20 years or so, we have had a 
bellyfull of ‘deficit fetishism’, as though the eco­
nomic health of a nation could be measured entirely 
(or even at all) by the difference between govern­
ment expenditure (G) and government income 
(T) regardless of the sizes of G and T themselves, or 
of the state of the economy when it is measured. So 
let us get away from this obsession once and for all 
and reinstate our common sense. I shall assume for 
the purpose of this article—perhaps this shows my 
own lack of common sense—that at the federal 
level a Labor government is in office. I would argue 
that, by and large, what G should be, at common­
wealth, state and local levels, should be determined 
by longer-term aspirations reflecting both the over­
all philosophies of the democratically-elected gov­
ernment in power, as well as well thought-out and 
integrated plans for the provision of social and 
industrial infrastructure inducements to, and help 
for, the private sector.
However, as government expenditure impinges 
on the immediate overall activity of the economy 
too, the implication is that most of the adjustment 
from the government sector needed to fit in with
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the activity that the private sector is providing must 
be through govemment income (T), complemented 
by appropriate monetary policy. The latter will 
have to be associated mostly with selective credit 
rationing—for if Australia continues to have a 
floating exchange rate, the structure of interest 
rates will primarily be determined by overseas trad­
ing, and lending and borrowing.2
This way of looking at govemment outlays and 
income (G and T) brings to the fore some elemen­
tary and old-fashioned economic lessons which 
nevertheless are often forgotten. Govemment ex­
penditure may be divided into (at least) three 
categories— current expenditure, capital expendi­
ture, and transfer payments. The first two have 
immediate and direct impacts on employment crea­
tion. Their longer-term effects differ markedly and 
so they should be sharply differentiated from one 
another. The third category only has indirect ef­
fects on activity here and now, and in the future. As 
it entails transfer between citizens, it is only the net 
effect on spending of such transfers that are relevant 
for activity and employment. (The equity aspects 
are, of course, relevant but are outside the rubric of 
this article. I am also abstracting here from the 
effects of transfer payments between us and over­
seas where the effects are much more substantial 
and direct, both immediately and in the future.)
Making such a sharp distinction between cur­
rent and capital expenditure should lead to a re­
think about the nature and significance of govem­
ment deficits and surpluses. Much of govemment 
capital expenditure consists of the provision of 
necessary social and industrial infrastructure, the 
returns to which only come in the medium to 
distant future and the immediate impacts of which 
on employment are markedly different (housing, 
health, education and transport are obvious exam­
ples).
Thus, it really is foolish economics to expect 
total govemment outlays to be covered by total 
income, regardless of where the economy is in the 
various stages of the trade cycle, or where it is at in 
its projected development over the medium to 
longer term. In an ordinary business which is both 
viable and growing, we would neverexpect its entire 
outlays, current and capital, always or indeed ever 
to be covered by its current receipts. Annual profits 
are, in fact, declared before interest payments on 
long-term borrowed funds are taken into account, 
and certainly after periodic amortisation reckon­
ings. We can use this procedure as an analogy for 
the govemment sector and examine how current 
revenues measure up against current outlays. We 
should include in the latter imputed interest on the 
capital outlayed on the provision of infrastructure 
(here we depart from private practice) and esti­
mates of the social rate of amortisation of the capital 
projects.
It still may be that in some circumstances we
would wish govemment income greatly to exceed 
this associated estimate of govemment expendi­
ture, depending upon how the private sector was 
faring (and on how the govemment wished it to 
fare). But at least we would get away from the 
foolishness of a crude comparison of the Budget 
balance which cries ‘disaster’ if there is a shortfall, 
even when govemment income is adjusted to its 
‘full employment’ level.
The Australian scene is complicated by our 
federal setup, with the possibility that state govern­
ments may be of a different political complexion to 
that of the federal govemment. As in any democ­
racy, compromise and give and take will be needed. 
At least minimum agreement could be obtained on, 
first, the accounting procedures used to measure the 
health or otherwise of govemment finances, and, 
second, implementing those expenditures for which 
the commonwealth govemment is responsible but 
which in practice are implemented at state levels 
through state institutions.
If budgets are not balanced over the cycle, that 
is, total expenditure on average is greater than 
income, it will be necessary to keep a close eye on 
the debt to income ratio implied. For if a deficit (on 
average) were also to imply a rising debt to income 
ratio, we would be building an eventual source of 
instability into the structure of our economy. If, 
however, the ratio were to remain constant over 
time—not least because increasing the debt in the 
first place indirectly helped to raise income over 
time at a satisfactory pace—then there does not 
seem to be any overwhelming reason to worry about 
expenditure exceeding income.
All of this is not to belittle the extent of Austral­
ia’s economic predicament or the need for exten­
sive structural reform. The vast amount of restruc­
turing required if Australia is to sustain a more 
competitive industrial structure almost certainly 
requires a brake on total consumption expenditure. 
While there is considerable room for redistribution 
within this total towards the less well-off, neverthe­
less the bulk of extra production in Australia at the 
moment ought to go into accumulation. This may 
require a rise in total govemment income even 
though, at the moment, there is heavy unemploy­
ment which needs steadily to be reduced. As in the 
UK, the long-term needs of the economy and the 
state of the balance of payments imply that we need 
a ‘High Street’-led recovery, as the Brits say— 
meaning a consumer-led recovery—like we need a 
hole in the head. I realise that constraints on 
consumption require a further period of real sacri­
fice by the bulk of the workforce—unlike the Brits, 
Australia does not have the equivalent of a cushion 
of North Sea oil to allow 8-10 years of a fool’s 
paradise to reign.
Enterprise bargaining is going to complicate 
this task even more, for it will tend to make more 
unequal the pre-tax distribution of income. We
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shall therefore need some rather nifty revisions of 
rates of taxation in order to restrain total consump­
tion expenditure in an equitable manner. Moreo­
ver, the instability built into the consumption side 
of the Australian economy by the vast extension of 
credit facilities for all will make the task even 
harder. But it should not be beyond the wit of the 
bright young things in the Treasury to provide 
their political masters with a number of ingenious 
schemes from which the latter may choose in order 
to attain their desired ends.
Nor would 1 suggest keeping the brakes on 
consumption forever. In a mixed economy the 
ultimate stimulus to accumulation in large meas­
ure must be an expectation of a healthy rate of 
growth of the consumption demands of its citizens. 
Only then may we be sure that the ‘animal spirits’ 
of the decision-makers in the private sector remain 
vigorous and dynamic.
I have mentioned our horrendous unemploy­
ment problem and the overseas balance constraint.
I deplore the departure from a commitment to full 
employment—a departure, moreover, that had the 
blessing of anumber of prominent Australian econo­
mists who, in retrospect, ought to be thoroughly 
ashamed of themselves3. However, I do think it is 
worthwhile remembering that Keynes and his clos­
est colleagues in the 1930s thought that the statis­
tical orders of magnitude of unemployment which 
would be associated with the disappearance of 
involuntary unemployment due to deficiency of 
aggregate demand, were around 6-8% of the 
workforce. (Though, by the 1960s there had been 
a sea change in attitudes on orders of magnitude by 
Keynes’ disciples, with negligible rates of unem­
ployment now regarded as the aim.)
There is a moral here. The moral is not that we 
should rest content with these higher orders of 
magnitude but, rather, that when they are at­
tained, in order then to reduce unemployment to 
more socially acceptable levels, we should rely 
more on microeconomic policies (which should be 
occurring anyway) rather than continuing gener­
ally to increase government spending or generally 
encourage private spending. Such microeconomic 
policies would include retraining, relocation (of 
both capital and labour), and rehousing. Coupled 
with this understanding is the need to rethink the 
new moves in the Accord. For one of the essential 
aims of the Accord was to influence the overall 
increase of money wages and therefore the overall 
cost level—an essential prerequisite for Australia 
to reach and then sustain levels of unemployment 
which we could reasonably regard as consistent 
with full employment and continuing growth.
Anotheraspect of restructuring associated with 
microeconomic policy and the role of government 
should be the provision of government help via 
information services and general back-up to ex­
porters (and entrepreneurs involved in import re­
placement) , to help them find and then secure niche 
markets. This is an obvious lesson which Australia 
could learn from those Newly Industrialising Coun­
tries (NICs) which gave business people their heads 
but backed them up in the national interest as well. 
A by-product of being successful in this regard may 
be a reversal of the trend whereby the ‘brightest and 
the best’ were attracted to services and finance 
sectors by the grossly distorted signals which were 
given out in the 1980s. Another lesson from the 
NICs is that we should leave tariff levels where they 
are, at least in the medium term.
We also need to think of measures which will 
eliminate harmful speculation in finance and prop­
erty markets so that prices and rewards there may 
more fully and fruitfully reflect useful economic 
activity. In this way present and past savings will be 
gathered together in a more socially useful way. On 
the side of real investment the government should 
take the lead in designing investment incentives 
which persuade business people to invest in those 
areas which, overall, the government has decided 
most need to be developed. Provided these areas are 
defined broadly enough, the chances of corruption 
will be lessened, yet neither the government nor its 
public servants will be able to dodge the responsibil­
ity for giving leadership in what should be a partner­
ship between the public and private sectors. ■
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1.1 thank, but in no way implicate, Keith Abbott, Jonathan 
Michie, Peter Nolan, Claudio Sardoni, Ajit Singh, Rod 
Tyers and John Wells for comments on a draft of this 
article.
2. Incidentally, as I am writing aboutappropriate monetary 
policy, may I refer readers to the passages in the Home 
Address where I urged the Reserve Bank of Australia to 
give a lead in encouraging the trading banks to make 
longer-term assessments of their customers’ viability— 
and, if these are favourable, enable them to see through any 
short-term difficulties? 1 would now say that the Reserve 
Bank should insist and ensure that they are able to do this.
3 .1 vaguely remember being summoned by a well-known 
professor of economics some time in the 1970s to a highly 
secret meeting of about ten or so Australian professors of 
economics at the University of Melbourne. There we were 
urged to ‘educate’ the public to accept higher levels of 
unemployment than had been the feature of the post war 
world. 1 remember that only land one other person present 
were scandalised by the request; in retrospect 1 bitterly 
regret not ‘spilling the beans’ about it all at the time. Now 
that 1 am, I can’t remember exactly when it occurred or who 
was there!
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